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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CIVIL
DISCOVERY
JUDITH A. MCKENNA * & ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS **
INTRODUCTION
Rulemaking is, in large part, about prediction.' For example, ex-
perience and common sense led different commentators to different
predictions about how mandatory disclosure would be likely to work
on a national basis.' But rulemaking is also about observation and
belief about how the world works now. This paper summarizes the state
of the legal system's knowledge—and, to a lesser extent, beliefs—about
how the federal civil discovery system works.' It also notes, in places,
what is not known but may be important to an informed decision about
changes to discovery rules.
I. BACKGROUND
Broad discovery became available to civil litigants in the federal
courts as a result of the adoption of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Federal Rules" or "Rules"). One of the themes and aims
of the new rules was full disclosure: "Full access to the evidence would
end trial by ambush and surprise. Open discovery would promote
settlements; with both sides obliged to turn over all their important
* Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial Center; B.A., Seton Hill College, 1976; ID., University
of Maryland, 1984; Ph.D., The Johns Hopkins University, 1985.
** Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial Center; B.S., University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, 1980; J,D., University of Maryland, 1987; Ph.D., The Johns Hopkins University, 1987. Sum-
maries and critiques of the research discussed in this Article arc available in appendix form from
the authors and the Boston College Law Review. The authors gratefully acknowledge the able
assistance of Roy Pardee, a graduate student in law and psychology at the University of Ariiona,
in the preparation of that appendix.
I See Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 569, 574 (1994) (citing, inter alia, MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 5 (1953) ("Any policy conclusion necessarily rests on a prediction about
the consequences of doing one thing rather Man another.").
2 See generally, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al,, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform,
27 GA. L. Rzv. 1 (1992); Robert D. Comer & Daniel L. Ruhinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery
Rules, 84 GEO. L,J. 51 (1995); Williatn W Schwarzer, In Defense of "Automatic Disclosure in
Discovery," 27 GA. L. REv. 655 (1993).
3 Our review of empirical literature does not include new research conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ("Advisory Committee") in preparation
for its September 1997 symposium on discovery nor recent work by the Federal Judicial Center
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cards, secrets would disappear and realistic negotiations would occur."
To this utopian end, Rule 26 made generally discoverable, absent a
valid privilege, all information relevant to the subject matter of the
action.
Another major theme of the new discovery scheme was that dis-
covery was to be left to the lawyers, with minimal judicial involvement
in litigation until the trial of the case. Later amendments expanded
lawyer control, allowing use of most discovery methods without leave
of court or judicial order. Consistent with the theory of discovery as a
broad inquiry into relevant matters, the burden of objecting to par-
ticular sorts of discovery or particular requests was placed on the party
from whom discovery was sought.
Little work was done in the years following the adoption of the
original rules or their amendments to determine whether they
achieved their desired effect. 5
 By the tate 1960s, however, commenta-
tors had begun to complain that the discovery rules were not function-
ing as their drafters had hoped—in particular, they perceived overuse
of discovery as a problem. Before considering proposed amendments
to remedy these asserted problems, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules ("Advisory Committee") commissioned the Columbia Project for
Effective Justice ("Columbia Project") to conduct a field survey of
pretrial discovery in federal courts. 6
The Columbia Project field survey was the first major inquiry into
actual discovery practice in the federal courts and today remains one
of the most comprehensive and thought-provoking studies in the area.
Fundamental changes were forgone for some time because the Advi-
sory Committee credited the survey's findings that there were no
widespread or profound failings in the scope or availability of discovery
("FTC") and RAND Institute ("RAND") pursuant to the Civil justice Reform Act. Also, although
we cite to nonempirical literature on several points, we made no attempt to review all the
literature on civil discovery for this paper.
4 Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2198 (1989).
5 See Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments,
LAw & CwrrEmn. Pitons., Summer 1988, at 69 (only about 30 studies reported during time rules
were developed and for 50 years thereafter). See generally DANIEL SEGAL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR.,
SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS
AND PROPOSED REFORMS (1978) (only one entry clearly empirically based); Michael Chiorazzi et
al., Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, LAw CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1988, at 87 (only nine entries attributed to discovery, three describing different
aspects of the same study).
6
 The findings of that project are reported in WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968).
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and that the costs of discovery were not oppressive, either in relation
to ability to pay or to the stakes of litigation.''
Not all observers were equally sanguine about the state of discov-
ery. 8 Then, and ever since, many decried what they saw as growing
problems with discovery. Frequently, the label attached to the complex
of perceived problems was "discovery abuse." In a manner reminiscent
of the shaping of conventional wisdom about "lawsuit abuse" and the
"litigation explosion" (and perhaps by the same mechanisms), percep-
tions based on potentially unrepresentative experiences coalesced in a
widely shared belief that discovery abuse was a pervasive and serious
phenomenon. 9
Indeed, the current reporter to the Advisory Committee has noted
that discovery has been on the Committee's docket constantly for three
decades, yet "falchingly persuasive complaints continue to be made
about the misuse, overuse, and abuse of discovery. 9 • 10 If, as is often
noted, discovery has become the bulk of the civil litigator's work, it is
perhaps not surprising that discovery continues as a major part of the
Committee's agenda. But it is fair to ask whether the complaints di-
rected to the Committee actually reflect the reality experienced by
most participants in most cases, the memorable nightmares of a few or
problems encountered in a small but recurring and important portion
of the federal civil docket.
II. SUMMARY AND BRIEF CRITIQUE OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
During the last few decades, the debate over discovery reform has
proceeded largely, but not entirely, with reference to salient personal
experiences and not with the benefit of empirical evidence." Like all
7 See Fan. R. Civ. P. Part V advisory committee's notes (explanatory statement concerning
1970 amendments of the discovery rules).
8 See SEGAL, supra note 5, at 10.
9 See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse
and the Consequences of Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1994); see also
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (discovery is "not infrequently
exploited to the disadvantage of justice"); Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial
Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REV. 264, 264 (1979) (abuse of discovery difficult to detect but widespread);
John K. Setear, Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules; Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352,
352 (1982) (liberal discovery provisions adopted in 1938 "have given rise to widespread discovery
abuse").
10 Edward H. Cooper, Rule 26: The Scope of Discovery 1 (Oct. 1996) (reporter's notes on
discovery reform proposals) (on tile with Boston College Law Review).
"Although dated, a few exceptions to the dearth of good research on civil discovery are
especially notable, if not "required reading" for those interested in the topic. The first is the
report of a field study by the Columbia Project for Effective Justice. See generally GLASER, supra
note 6. The second is a Federal Judicial Center report, part of the District Court Study Series,
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empirical research, these empirical studies vary in utility and gener-
alizability. The most informative studies examine what participants
actually do and why they do it, not merely what they say they do or
what they think. Of course, any single investigation of discovery activity
must focus on a subset of the issues surrounding discovery practice;
different questions require different types of methods and sources of
information.
Surveys and interviews of attorneys, judges and litigants, studies
of court files and studies of law firm files all provide information about
discovery useful to policy makers, but all have their limitations. A study
of court files, for example, provides only limited information because
discovery papers (i.e., requests and responses) often are not filed with
the court. Furthermore, such a study does not tap information about
discovery activity that takes place outside the formal structure of the
Rules. A study of law firm files or surveys of and interviews with
attorneys, litigants and judges could provide converging information
about formal discovery activity and better information about informal
discovery practice. Interviews and surveys may also provide a richness
of information that cannot be gleaned from studies of records—exami-
nation of court and attorney records can help researchers understand
what is happening in discovery but may not reveal why certain things
are happening. Unless the surveys and interviews are focused on spe-
cific cases, however, those surveyed or interviewed may report com-
monly held beliefs about discovery practice, many of which may not
describe their own experiences.
In addition to surveys, interviews and case file studies, several
other types of studies may help address important research issues. One
type of study would entail asking attorneys to keep detailed diaries of
that provides a largely quantitative look at federal civil discovery and its relationship to judicial
management. See generally PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL C'Ett., JUDICIAL CONTROLS
& TOE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978). The third is a series of articles by Wayne
D. Brazil reporting on a "pilot study" of 180 Chicago lawyers. The Brazil study, although limited
as a source of quantitative information about discovery, is exceptionally rich in detail and
illuminating on the issues of the incentives governing civil discovery practice. See generally Wayne
D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers about the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217 [hereinafter Brazil (1980a)]; Wayne D. Brazil, Civil
Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 A.I. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 787 [hereinafter Brazil (1980b)]. An example of a well-designed study of limited gener-
alizability only because of its limitation to state court cases in Iowa is David S. Walker, Profession-
alism and Procedure: Notes on an Empirical Study, 38 DRAKE L. Ray. 759 (1988). A more recent
study provides an excellent overview of discovery practice in the state courts. See generally Susan
Keilitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in Slate Trial Courts out of Control?, ST. CT. J., Spring 1993, at 8
[hereinafter Keilitz et al. (1993a)J; Susan Kcilitz et al., Attorneys' Views of Civil Disco-uery,JuncEs'
J., Spring 1993, at 14 [hereinafter Kcilitz et al. (1993b)].
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discovery activity in a particular case or cases. In addition to merely
writing down the discovery activities in which they participated and the
time they spent, the attorneys would be asked to describe why they took
each step. It would be important for attorneys to describe discovery
requests that they propounded as well as ones they received. This
method could address the general issue of what discovery activity
(informal and formal) actually takes place. It could also address the
issue of abuse, to the extent improper motivation is identified as a
component of abuse and to the extent attorneys give honest informa-
tion on this issue. As one would imagine, practical concerns (e.g.,
about confidentiality) make such research difficult but perhaps not
impossible.
Finally, simulation studies, which require research participants to
respond to Systematically varied, hypothetical situations, could also be
used to address a variety of issues. Although they lack some of the
hallmarks of external validity, simulation studies could examine the
impact of various innovations to the discovery system and identify what
different types of clients and attorneys feel to be essential elements of
discovery under a variety of different circumstances.
In what follows, we summarize findings of the major empirical
studies of federal (and, where relevant, state) civil discovery that have
examined the incidence and volume of civil discovery, its problems and
abuses, the costs and benefits of discovery, and proposed changes to
the discovery system. Detailed reviews of the most important empirical
studies on civil discovery were supplied to symposium participants in
an appendix to the symposium draft of this article.P2
A. Incidence and Volume of Civil Discovery
Proposals to change the discovery rules reflect beliefs about what
discovery practice currently looks like and about why it looks that way.
In particular, they reflect assumptions about the interaction of lawyers,
litigants and the courts. In this section we describe what empirical
research has shown about the nature of these interactions and how
they relate to discovery practice.
12 The appendix is on File with the Boston College Law Review. The appendix describes the
purpose and methods of the reviewed studies, and criticisms or qualifying information to be
considered when interpreting the findings of some of them.
790	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 39:785
1. Amount of Discovery
Formal discovery actually occurs in fewer cases than uninformed
observers might estimate. In the 1978 Federal Judicial Center ("FJC")
study of more than 3000 federal civil cases sampled from six metro-
politan districts, Paul Connolly and his colleagues found that 72% of
the cases had no more than two. discovery events, with no formal
discovery at all in 52% of the cases." In the Civil Litigation Research
Project ("CLRP"), which included both state and federal cases, David
Trubek and his colleagues found recorded discovery events in slightly
fewer than one-half of the cases. 14
 More recent evidence from state
courts suggests that this pattern continues to hold: a 1988 National
Center for State Courts ("NCSC") study found that no formal discovery
occurred in 42% of 2190 cases sampled from five general jurisdiction
courts in four states. In the 58% that had some discovery activity, the
number of discovery requests ranged from 1 to 88, with a mean of 6.4
and a median of 4. 15
Discovery incidence estimates cannot be compared directly across
studies and therefore, do not faithfully reflect differences over time or
between jurisdictions. In each study reviewed, researchers made differ-
ent choices about which case types to include.mIn a study that includes
15 See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at 28-29. A telephone survey conducted in the same
study indicated that about 75% of discovery activity would be reflected in court files. See id at
95. It is not known whether the proportions of formal and informal discovery have changed. The
FJC's 1987 District Court Time Study also gives us indirect information about discovery incidence.
Attorneys in a sample of recently closed cases were asked several discovery-related questions.
Response patterns suggest that discovery occurred in about 72% 'of these cases. The sample,
however, excluded several case types thought to generate discovery only rarely. See Summary of
Oral Presentation by John E. Shapard to the FJC Research Conference on Civil Discovery
Concerning the 1987 FJC District Court Time Study (Sept. 20-21, 1997) (on file with the Boston
College Law Review), Similarly, in the Columbia Project, which chose cases deliberately to maxi-
mize the likelihood of finding discovery activity, discovery was reported by two-thirds of the
attorneys in its mail survey. See GLASER, supra note 6, at 53.
14 See David M. Trubek et al, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89-90
(1983). Of the state and federal cases in the study, 46.1% had recorded discovery activity.
15 See Keilitz et al. (1993a), supra note 11, at 10. Similarly, Dennis Krystek examined 429
randomly selected tort and contract/commercial cases in one Louisiana parish court and found
a like result: 62% of the cases with no more than two events and 44% with none at all. See Dennis
J. Krystek, Discovery versus Delay in Chat District Court: A Cross-Sectional Pilot Study of Civil District
Court Reveals No Significant Correlation, 42 LA. B.J. 255, 257 (1994). Walker reported that of 1400
Iowa state civil cases studied, only 24% had any formal discovery, See Walker, supra note 11, at
781, 824.
16 For example, the 1978 FJC study covered almost the full range of federal litigation,
including prisoner cases, which have little discovery (see ColsmoLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at 85
& n.171); Keilitz excluded cases she deemed unlikely to have discovery (see Keilitz et al. (1993a),
supra note 11, at 16 n.14); Krystek excluded everything except tort and contract/commercial
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a court's entire caseload, discovery rates will be low and many cases in
the sample will shed no light on other discovery-related issues of
interest. Indeed, discovery researchers have needed to eliminate large
classes of litigation from their samples just to get enough cases to study
the asserted problems. A sampling strategy designed to create a rich
source of information about discovery by uncovering high-discovery or
problem-discovery cases is suitable for much discovery research, but
does not provide a solid basis for estimating discovery incidence rates
for civil litigation as a whole.
The total volume of discovery is likewise lower than often as-
sumed. Cases involving extensive discovery are in fact relatively rare—
the studies using actual file reviews uncovered very few cases involving
more than ten discovery requests, perhaps 5-15% depending on the
sampling method. In the 1978 FJC study, less than 5% of the case files
examined recorded more than ten discovery requests; of cases with at
least some discovery, 90% had no more than ten requests. 17
2. The Relationship of Discovery to Case Characteristics
Studies based on court records show that both discovery incidence
(whether any discovery is undertaken) and discovery volume (how
many discovery requests are made) are generally related to case com-
plexity, with complexity evidenced by various case characteristics.I 8 As
would be expected, the type of case or area of law involved affects the
incidence and volume of discovery. Glaser reported that personal in-
jury cases were more likely than commercial cases to involve at least
one discovery request, but that commercial litigation—particularly pat-
ent and antitrust cases--generated more discovery work. 19 Connolly
cases (see Krystek, supra note 15, at 257); and Walker excluded only domestic relations cases (see
Walker, supra note 11, at 770 n.65). The object of the CLRP study was to describe "ordinary"
litigation. Accordingly, 37 "mega" cases (all federal) were excluded from the sample, as were all
cases in which less than $1000 was in controversy. See Trubek et al, supra note 14, at 80-82. The
Columbia Project excluded many case types from its mail survey to focus on major types of civil
litigation and purposively sampled high-discovery case types for its interviews. See GLASER, supra
note 6, at 45-48.
17 Put another way, of the 3114 cases examined, 152 had more than 10 requests. The average
number of requests in these 152 cases was '17.5. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at 28-29.
Similarly, Walker found that less than 5% of cases entailed more than five discovery events and
less than 3% involved more than nine. See Walker, supra note 11, at 781, 824. The NCSC study
cases were also clustered in the low-discovery category; of the cases with any discovery, only 14%
had more than 10 requests. See Keilitz et al. (1993a), supra note 11, at 10-11.
to But this may become tautological—high discovery activity is sometimes used as evidence
of complexity.
19 See GLASER, supra note 6, at 73. Walker reported that in Iowa state courts, products liability,
professional malpractice and non-automobile personal injury and property damage cases were
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reported that in federal court both incidence and volume were rela-
tively high in securities; trade regulation, tort, intellectual property,
admiralty and contract cases. High discovery volume (more than ten
requests) was much more likely to occur in product liability, patent and
franchise contract cases. 2° Other case characteristics that affect discov-
ery activity are the number of separately represented parties, 2 ' the
number of claims (including counterclaims and cross-claims) 22
 and the
amount at stake."
B. Benefits of Discovery
What role does discovery play in securing the "just, speedy, and in-
expensive determination" of civil actions? The premise that, all things
being equal, "more is better" (i.e., the more information litigants have,
the greater the likelihood of a just outcome)" has come under attack
on two fronts. First, some take issue with the fundamental claim,
asserting that information availability sometimes leads to unjust results,
as where parties settle rather than risk the public disclosure of damag-
ing but arguably irrelevant information. More common is the second
criticism, that all things are seldom equal and a liberal discovery system
most likely to involve at least one discovery request. See Walker, supra note 11, at 823. More
recently (and somewhat contradictorily) Keilitz reported that vehicle tort, malpractice/product
liability and other tort cases were most likely to have at least one discovery request, with the
average number of requests being substantially higher in malpractice/product liability cases
(11.5) than in vehicle tort (5.3) or other tort (7.5). See Keilitz et al. (1993a), supra note 11, at
12.
20 See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at 43-44. For an explanation of the amount and
nature of discovery activity observed in products liability cases, see generally Francis H. Hare,.1r.
and James L. Gilbert, Discovery in Products Liability Cases: The Plaintiff's Plea for Judicial Under-
standing, 12 Am. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 413 (1989).
2t Cases with more than two parties tend to generate more discovery. The NCSC study found
that 53% of cases with two parties involved discovery, with an average of 4.9 requests. For cases
with three parties, these numbers climbed to 69% and 7.8 requests. For cases with four or more
parties, the corresponding numbers are 75% and 15 requests. See Keilitz at al. (1993a), supra
note 11, at 12. In the FJC study, in cases with some discovery, there was a steady increase in the
proportion of high- and moderate-volume discovery cases as the number of parties grew. Each
additional party increased the mean number of discovery requests by 1.05. See CONNOLLY ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 43-46. Of course, the number of recorded discovery requests does not always
signal the number of discovery events. In multiparty litigation, for example, a single deposition
may involve questioning by several parties, each filing its own deposition notice.
22 See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at 46-47. Cases with counterclaims averaged 2.2 more
discovery requests than those without counterclaims; for cases with cross-claims, this difference
was 2.8 requests. See id. at 47.
23
 The relationship between discovery and stakes is discussed more fully in Section II.B.
24 See Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
Enough is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579, 581.
May 19981
	 CIVIL DISCOVERY RESEARCH 	 793
often imposes burdens on discovery respondents that are dispropor-
tionate to the benefits of the discovery.
Researchers have examined the proportionality and sufficiency of
discovery by examining (1) the level of discovery activity in relation to
the stakes of cases; (2) how discovery needs relate to discovery actually
had; and (3) the relationship of discovery to case outcome.
1, The Level of Discovery Activity and the Stakes of Cases
Some studies have found both discovery incidence and volume to
be related to the stakes of the case. Glaser found that the incidence of
discovery was related to attorneys' predictions of the amount that
would be recovered. Only two-thirds of respondents who predicted
recovery of $2500 or less used discovery, whereas 75% of those predict-
ing recovery between $2500 and $40,000 used discovery, and 92% of
respondents predicting recovery of more than $40,000 did so. 25 In
Walker's Iowa study, the volume of discovery was related to the amount
in controversy—cases with more than twenty requests were more likely
to be cases with higher amounts in controversy. 26 But the relationship
between stakes and discovery activity does not appear to be straight-
forward. For example, Trubek concluded that the stakes of the case
did not directly drive investments of time and money, but rather put a
cap on the number of lawyer hours invested. 27
Brazil divided his sample of attorneys into "subworlds" of small-
case attorneys (those whose ca ses had a median value of $25,000 or
less) and large-case attorneys (those whose cases had a median value
of $1,000,000 or more). He found that among small-case attorneys,
discovery played a less dominant role in the litigation process than it
did among large-case attorneys. Small-case attorneys used discovery
less often and less intensively, devoted a lower percentage of total
billable time to discovery than did large-case attorneys and committed
25 See GLASER, Supra note 6, at 56. Connolly found no relationship between amount in
controversy and discovery activity in the 1978 FJC study, but the authors attribute this to the fact
that their amount-in-controversy measure was limited to the plaintiff's ad damnum clause, a
notoriously bad indicator of the actual amount at stake. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at
40 & n.95, 47-51.
26 See Walker, supra note 11, at 790, 828.
27 See Tr [Thu* et al., supra note 14, at 95-96. Our reanalysis of the Walker data similarly
indicates that the median number of discovery requests is low in cases at all dollar amounts in
controversy, but it also indicates that variability in the number of requests is greater at the larger
dollar amounts. See Walker, supra note 11 (review is in appendix on the with the Boston College
Law Review).
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higher percentages of their time to investigations, negotiations and
trials:2s
2. How Discovery Needs Relate to Discovery Actually Had
Most of the literature on civil discovery has concentrated on the
relationship between discovery and the "speedy and inexpensive" de-
termination of civil actions. What role does discovery play in securing
"just" determinations? None of the research we examined attempted
to measure justness of outcome or the utility of discovered information
in obtaining it. If, however, we accept the premise that fuller exchange
of relevant information is likely to lead to more just outcomes, both
the Columbia Project and the Brazil study of Chicago lawyers shed
some light. In the Columbia Project, researchers asked attorneys about
whether they thought the use of discovery helped or hindered a just
disposition. Among the lawyers, 78% said discovery helped, and 21%
(mostly losers at trial) said it made no difference. Only about 1% said
it was a hindrance. 29
As part of his inquiry, Brazil asked about information left undis-
covered by opponents. Ninety-six percent of the lawyers reported hav-
ing settled a case while still possessing "arguably significant" informa-
tion that opposing counsel had failed to discover. Lawyers whose
median case size was $1,000,000 or more reported that this occurred
in one of every two settlements; lawyers whose median case value was
$25,000 or less reported such settlements less often, in one of four
settlements.'° Seventy-nine percent reported trying a case to comple-
28 See Brazil (1980a), supra note 11, at 223. Brazil also subdivided his sample of attorneys in
several other ways that tended to differentiate between small-case and large-case attorneys. See
Brazil (1980b), supra note 11, at 791, 802-04, 895-902. The subgroupings were based on sub-
stantive practice area (attorneys who included automobile personal injury among the principal
type of cases handled versus those who included antitrust or securities matters), proportion of
cases brought in federal court (attorneys bringing 20% or fewer of their cases in federal court
versus those bringing 80% or more), client type (attorneys who spent 50% or more of their time
in the employ of individuals versus 50% or more of their time in the employ of corporations)
and firm size (attorneys practicing in firms of five or fewer attorneys versus those practicing in
firms of 120 or more). The defining characteristics of the subgroups were highly correlated with
one another. For instance, the antitrust lawyers brought an average of 81% of their cases in federal
court and had a median case value of $998,000. In contrast, auto personal injury lawyers brought
an average of 5% of their cases in federal court and had a median case value of $25,000. Not all
of the subgroupings account for the entire sample of attorneys. For example, only 56% of the
attorneys interviewed fell into one of the two categories based on median case value. Accordingly,
it is unclear how the nature of discovery conducted by those who handle cases in the mid-range
compares to that conducted by those handling small- and large-value cases. See id,
29 See GLASER, supra note 6, at 112.
30 See Brazil (1980h), supra note 11, at 811.
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Lion while opposing counsel had failed to discover something of argu-
able importance.'' Similarly, 88% of the attorneys reported settling a
case suspecting that the opposition had not disclosed something of
arguable importance."
Brazil also found:
• Eighty-three percent of the attorneys reported having been
surprised with undiscovered information at trial, but the rate of occur-
rence was fairly low (10% of trials)."
• Overall, 95% of respondents indicated that at some point in
their practice, the way they had prepared a witness for deposition had
resulted in the opposing counsel's failing to discover significant infor-
mation. Respondents estimated that in 50% of their cases, witness
preparation had induced a failure of discovery. 34
• Eighty-one percent indicated that they had, at least once, made
an early settlement offer to prevent the discovery of damaging infor-
mation. But the frequency with which these attorneys engaged in this
practice was low."
• Although most attorneys (81%) could recall refraining from
pursuing some information because of the cost of doing so, most
reported that this was a fairly rare occurrence (the median response
regarding the percentage of cases in which this happened was 20%). 36
Brazil describes in detail how the frequency of the above events
varied by subgroup membership. Generally speaking, large-case attor-
neys reported that discovery is less likely to be successful in the sense
that the parties' discovery efforts often fail to dislodge all the sig-
nificant information."
3. The Relationship of Discovery to Case Outcome
There is some evidence that discovery is not cost-effective for all
parties. In the CLRP, Trubek concluded that for plaintiffs, increased
31 See id. at 813. In the Columbia Project, respondents in cases in which one or both sides
engaged in discovery were more likely to report that all relevant evidence came out at trial and
that no extraneous witnesses were called. On the other hand, attorneys in . these cases were
somewhat less likely to report that no irrelevant evidence was offered or that no extraneous issues
were presented by either side. But, as the author pointed out, no-discovery trials are rare (13
cases in the project's sample), so conclusions from these findings must be tentative. See GLASER,
supra note 6, at 104-05.
32 See Brazil (1980b), supra note 11, at 816.
33 See id. at 817-18.
34 See id. at 819.
35 See id. at 821-22.
36 See id. at 83940.
37 See Brazil (19806), supra note 11, at 816.
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lawyer time spent on discovery was associated with decreased measures
of success." Similarly, Glaser in the Columbia Project concluded that
discovery is less profitable for plaintiffs. The more days plaintiffs spent
in discovery, the lower their recovery relative to expectations. For
defendants, the number of days spent in discovery was independent of
the amount they were ultimately liable to pay. 39
Glaser found that attorney satisfaction with case outcomes was
unrelated to whether or not the attorney had engaged in discovery.
This was true whether the case settled or went to trial and, for those
who went to trial, whether the attorney won or lost. Client satisfaction,
as reported by their attorneys, was likewise unrelated to the occurrence
of discovery, except that defendants who lost at trial reported slightly
more satisfaction when their attorneys had engaged in discovery. 4°
Glaser also found that, despite attorneys' convictions that discov-
ery hastens settlement, cases with more discovery were actually less
likely to settle. The number of days spent in discovery was associated
with both increases in the number of disagreements between the sides
concerning factual and legal issues and lower proportions of cases
settling before trial. Cases where neither side engaged in discovery
settled out of court in 97% of the cases. The corresponding proportion
for cases where both sides discovered was 76%. As the value of the cases
rose, the anti-settlement effects of discovery increased. These effects
remained even after statistical controls for case complexity and case
size were employed, perhaps suggesting that sunk costs substantially
affect settlement behavior."
C. Costs of Discovery
1. Litigant Costs
Incidence and volume of discovery events are only crude measures
of the costs and burdens of litigation. Counting depositions, the num-
ber of interrogatories or even the number of information items actu-
ally requested tells us fairly little about the time and expense required
either to propound discovery or to respond to it. The actual costs of
discovery have rarely been quantified in empirical studies, and the
studies reviewed are too dated on this point to be directly applicable
38 See Trubek et al., supra note 14, at 110-16. Success was measured by the relationship of
recovery to legal fees incurred, not purely by the likelihood of winning or losing at a trial. See id,
39 See GLASER, supra note 6, at 90-91.
48
 See id. at 112-13.
11 See id. at 91-100.
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to current conditions. Comprehensive cost studies are complicated by
different fee arrangements and particularly by the methodological
question of how to treat discovery costs incurred by lawyers in zero- or
low-recovery contingent fee cases. The few studies that have attempted
to describe discovery cost are perhaps more illustrative of the difficul-
ties of such research than of the actual cost picture, but they are worth
examining.42
The Columbia Project report gives us some idea of how discovery
costs are distributed and how they relate to overall costs and to case
type, although the report is seriously dated on cost issues.^ 3 In that
project, both absolute discovery costs and the relationship of discovery
costs to total costs varied by case type and sometimes by party. The
researchers found that discovery costs were an appreciable component
of total fees across the range of cases studied, but were especially high
for certain case types. For example, in antitrust actions, discovery
represented 65% of plaintiffs' costs and 63% of defendants' costs. But
in patent cases, discovery accounted for 21% of plaintiffs' costs and
54% of defendants' costs. Over all case types, defendants tended to
have higher costs on average, but plaintiffs' costs were more variable,
and the highest costs were consistently borne by plaintiffs."
Particularly interesting for the debate about curtailing over-discov-
ery as an abuse inflicted on parties from whom discovery is sought is
the finding that both sides spent more generating their own discovery
requests than responding to those of their adversaries. This cost differ-
ential was greater for plaintiffs than for defendants, but overall, defen-
dants spent more than plaintiffs both generating their own discovery
requests and responding to those of their adversaries in the median
cases. Estimated discovery costs were also found to be related to the
stakes of the case—as the plaintiffs' expected recovery rose, so did the
medians of both defendant and plaintiff costs attributable to discov-
ery.45
42 The methodological difficulties inherent in measuring discovery activity are detailed in
Patricia Lombard, The 13altimore Discovery Survey (unpublished Federal Judicial Center staff
paper) (sununary by Elizabeth C. Wiggins and Molly T. Johnson on file with the Boston College
Law Review). See Trubek et al., supra note 14, at 82-85 (the CLRP looked at the cost of "ordinary"
litigation) (study described in more detail infra note 48 and accompanying text).
43 For example, the mail survey portion of the study indicated that the median total discovery
cost was $250 for plaitiliffs and $400 for defendants. See GLASER, supra mac ti, at 166,
44 See id. at 162-77.
45 See id. at 171-72; see also F.R. Lacy, Discovery Costs in State Court Litigation, 57 OR. L. REV,
289, 297-99 (1978) (finding that the cost of discovery generally increased with the amount in
controversy). The Brazil findings regarding the relationship between cost and case characteristics
are discussed in more detail supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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In part because of the noncomparability of cost and fee informa-
tion between contingent and hourly-fee cases and across regions, the
Columbia Project researchers concluded that lawyer time is a more
meaningful measure of the cost-generating burdens of discovery. 46
(Lawyer time does not directly indicate the cost to litigants. This is a
problem for interpreting data not only from contingent-fee cases, but
from high-volume, big-firm cases in which discovery may be used as a
training ground for new attorneys. Total lawyer time and amounts
"billed" are of some interest, but if substantial portions of that time are
written off by the firm, these measures do not accurately reflect the
cost burden to litigants.) To estimate burden, the Columbia Project
researchers divided the number of days spent in discovery by the total
number of days spent on a case and found that the proportion of
litigation time spent in discovery was about 43% for heavy discovery
cases, but only 25-31% in the average case. 47
In the CLRP, Trubek studied costs in "ordinary" litigation—the
vast middle segment of litigation in which more than $1000 was in
controversy but in which neither the amount in controversy nor other
case features led the researchers to classify them as "mega" cases. The
median total lawyer time spent was 30.4 hours per case. Of this time,
the activity accounting for the most lawyer time was discovery, but that
time was only 16,7% of the total time, or a little more than five hours.
Two other activities accounted for similar amounts of attorney time,
"conferring with client" (16%) and "settlement discussions" (15.1%). 48
Normative decisions about discovery burden allocation, whether
case-by-case or system-wide, may require some knowledge of the extent
to which a heavy discovery burden is self-imposed. A corporation's
document production may be more time-consuming, and therefore
more expensive, when its records are poorly organized. Similarly, its
expenses for document production will be higher if it requires parale-
gals to number, index and scan every corporate document for CD-
ROM imaging. The fact that a party producing discoverable informa-
tion spends a lot of money in the process is only one part of the
analysis; policymakers may not want to alleviate or shift responsibility
for self-inflicted costs or those associated with the producing party's
own trial preparation.
46 See GLASER, supra note 6, at 167.
47
 See id. at 71, 73, 196. The project researchers also asked about direct discovery costs other
than lawyer time (e.g., transcripts), but concluded that lawyers' fees arc by far the largest discovery
cost, particularly in heavy-discovery cases. See id. at 167-70, 176, 200-01.
45 See Trubek et al., supra note 14, at 90-91.
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Discovery may impose other costs: lost productivity, lost opportu-
nities and lost business advantage because proprietary information is
disclosed, among others. No study has attempted to quantify such
effects, although respondents in the Brazil study mentioned them, and
it may fairly be presumed that such costs enter into the perception of
discovery problems elicited in polls of corporate litigants and their
counsel.
2. Judicial System Costs
Little data exist on the costs of discovery to non-litigants," but we
do have some information on the amount of judicial time associated
with it. The FJC's most recent district court time study found that about
5% of the case-related time of district judges is spent on discovery
matters (including scheduling and management efforts as well as dis-
covery motions, protective orders and the like). For magistrate judges,
the figure is about 13%. 5°
D. Incidence and Nature of Discovery Problems and "Abuse"
Observers of the civil justice system differ in their assessments of
the nature and amount of problem discovery. Attorneys, judges, liti-
gants, rulemakers, researchers and others may all have different per-
ceptions of what is proper discovery, what is legitimate but problematic
discovery and what is abusive discovery. Some focus on intentional
behavior as an element of abuse and might define it to include viola-
tions of the rules of procedure, violations of standards of professional
responsibility and transgressions of professional and social courtesy.
For example, some consider it abusive for an attorney to plan service
of a discovery request for the eve of an opponent's two-week vacation,
even though neither the content nor the timing of the request violates
any rules. Others take a purely economic view of discovery abuse,
finding it wherever the transaction costs of the discovery exceed the
value of the discovered information in resolving the dispute. 5 '
49 But for a description of some of the burdens discovery places on third-party witnesses such
as non-testifying scientific experts, see Elizabeth C. Wiggins and Judith A. McKenna, Researchers'
Reactions to Compelled Disclosure of Scientific Information, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1996,
at 75-91.
5° See John E. Shapard, Oral Presentation at Federal Judicial Center Research Conference
on Civil Discovery (Sept. 1991) (summary on file with Boston College Law Review).
91 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 63. While a potentially useful benchmark
for inefficient discovery, using the label "abuse" in these circumstances seems to connote inten-
tional behavior to no good purpose.
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In his report of the Columbia Project, Glaser adopted a behavioral
rather than an economic framework and described two major catego-
ries of discovery abuse: "pushing" and "tripping." The most typical
examples of "pushing" offenses are over-discovery and discovery for
improper purposes. In this study, "pushing" offenses, such as using
discovery to harass, were reported to be relatively rare. Only 15% of
lawyers thought their opponents used discovery in a harassing manner
even to a slight extent. But "fishing," which was not defined as abusive,
was complained of by 56% of the plaintiffs' lawyers and 59% of defense
attorneys.52
"Tripping" offenses are typically committed by parties from whom
discovery is sought; they include evasion, failure to cooperate with
discovery and even spoliation." "Tripping" offenses, particularly im-
peding or delaying discovery, were more commonly complained of
than "pushing" offenses. Evasive or late interrogatory responses were
the primary culprits."
In the vast majority of cases, discovery appears to be the self-exe-
cuting system the rules contemplate. Most incidents of "problem"
discovery, as perceived by lawyers, do not result in any formal request
for relief. If measured by formal objections, discovery motions activity
or sanctions requests, discovery problems do not appear to be ex-
treme." Walker's review of Iowa cases, for example, revealed that in
80% of the cases with interrogatories, requests for production or re-
quests for admission, no objections were filed, and in two-thirds of
them, no discovery motions activity occurred. 56
Like volume, the contentiousness of discovery and the incidence
of problems are related to certain characteristics of cases and their
participants, as we describe in the following sections. It is important to
note, however, that no research separates the possibly co-occurring
factors sufficiently to reach valid conclusions about the role each factor
plays in the discovery picture. Suppose, for example, that large anti-
52 See GLASER, supra note 6, at 118.
53
 See generally JosEPit L. EBERSOLE & BARLOW BURKE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY
PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES 74 (1980) (using similar categories, "overdiscovery" and "resistance,"
the authors report that resistance was more likely than over-discovery to trigger judicial interven-
tion).
54 See GLASER, supra note 6, at 140. Glaser provides additional information and speculation
about patterns of seeking judicial relief. See id. at 140-48.
55 See id. at 117-23. "The overwhelming majority of attorneys do not report aggressive
pushing." Id. at 120. As the author notes, however, evaluations of whether the number of reported
problems is "too high" or "gratifyingly small" depends on one's presuppositions about the system's
operation. Id. at 120.
56 See Walker, supra note 11, at 786-87.
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trust cases give rise to a lot of discovery and a lot of discovery problems
and that they are usually handled by big-firm litigators. Case type,
amount at stake and attorney/law firm characteristics are confounded
and we do not know which factor actually predicts heavy or abusive
discovery. A reader of the empirical information we summarize here
should keep these kinds of likely confounds in mind.
1. Discovery Problems and Their Relationship to Case
Characteristics
The factors associated with higher discovery volume are also asso-
ciated with a higher likelihood that problems will arise. Both case file
reviews and attorney surveys and interviews support this conclusion.
From his interviews, Brazil concluded that larger and more com-
plex cases tend to exhibit the following characteristics: (1) discovery
consumes a very substantial, often dominating percentage of the re-
sources committed to the entire litigation process; (2) discovery tools
are likely to be used more extensively and intensively; (3) tactical
considerations are more likely to affect decisions about discovery, and
tactical maneuvering is likely to play a substantially larger role in the
discovery process; (4) discovery is less likely to be successful in the
sense that the parties' discovery efforts often fail to dislodge all the
significant information from their opponents; (5) the attorney-client
privilege, the work-product doctrine, and other doctrinal sources of
protection of information are likely to be invoked more frequently and
their invocation is more likely to provoke costly disputes; (6) clients
are more likely to play an active role in making decisions about discov-
ery matters and more likely to exert pressure on counsel both to resist
complying with some discovery requests and to use discovery tools to
retaliate against or harass opposing parties."
Walker's study of case files shows that case type makes a difference:
he found that parties made discovery motions, generally rare in his
sample, in 40% of the professional malpractice cases and half of the
products liability cases in the sample. Auto accident cases, conversely,
spawned discovery motions only 20% of the time. 58
Similarly, high-stakes cases tend to produce more discovery mo-
tions. 59 Keilitz asked lawyers to rate the degree to which each of ten
named factors predicted discovery problems in a case. The only case-
37 See Brazil (1980a), supra note 11, at 229-30.
55 See Walker, supra note I I, at 788.
59 See id. at 788-89 (of the discovery motions filed, nearly half were in cases seeking $100,000
ur more or an unspecified "fair and adequate" relief).
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related characteristic the responding lawyers frequently associated with
discovery problems was large size of claim or money damages "
sought."6°
In general, then, as stakes, number of parties, number of claims
and case duration increase, both discovery activity and the incidence
of discovery-related friction between the parties increase. 6 t It is impos-
sible to determine with confidence whether the higher incidence of
problems in these circumstances tells us anything qualitative about the
nature of discovery in these cases or is merely a function of the fact
that more discovery requests and events create more opportunities for
problems. But Brazil's work suggests that increased interaction alone
may not completely explain the higher levels of discovery-related fric-
tion in large cases."
2. The Relationship of Discovery Problems to Participant
Characteristics
Discovery is also affected by the participants' personal charac-
teristics and incentives. Unlike conclusions about the effects of case
characteristics, which are often supported by case file review, the as-
serted relationship between discovery practice and personality or eco-
nomic incentives is typically either theoretical or based on opinion
surveys.
a. Attorneys
How do lawyer characteristics shape discovery practice? Hunches
abound—various commentators have posited potential causes of dis-
covery problems: inadequate education, training and supervision of
new attorneys; greed or pressure for billable hours; fear of under-dis-
covery (and perhaps of malpractice); fear of appearing weak or too
cooperative; fear of going to trial; decreased civility and collegiality of
the bar; or even a more adversarial climate in American society in
general.
The data that support these speculations come primarily from
opinion surveys about the causes of discovery problems. For example,
611 See Keilitz et al. (19931), supra note 11, at 35. More frequently reported as predictive of
problems were characteristics of participants in the litigation. See infra note 63 and accompanying
text.
61 1n the 1978 FJC study, as discovery activity increased, Rule 37 motions to compel and for
sanctions, and motions for protective order, increased as well. See CONNOLLY rr AL., supra note
11, at 34.
62 See Brazil (1980a), supra note 11, at 235-37.
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Keilitz found that surveyed attorneys rated "personality or style of the
opposing attorney(s)" the best predictor of discovery problems, fol-
lowed by inexperience of the opposing attorney and animosity between
the parties.63 Brazil's detailed interviews revealed that lawyers with
well-defined specialty practices believed discovery went more smoothly
when the opposing counsel was also a specialist in the field of law,
working in the same region." His respondents also offered some of the
usual complaints about opposing attorneys conducting discovery just
to run up the bills, overproducing or simply being unable to adapt
their usual discovery routine to the needs of the case. 65 No systematic
case file review, however, has been linked with assessments of the
subjective factors described above.
Much of the literature on incentives affecting discovery practice
is rooted in economic theory. 66 Yet, there is little information about
how lawyers actually make discovery decisions. Law firms differ in how
they handle discovery, and analyzing these differences and their impli-
cations could help identify the factors that influence the burdens of
discovery. The same discovery tasks that associates or paralegals handle
in one firm may be done by a partner in another firm, or by outside
support personnel in a third. Differences in firm organization and
practice area may lead to some firms being high-discovery-cost firms
and others being low-discovery-cost firms. Although both the Columbia
Project and the CLRP attempted to get a sense of the relationship
between attorney compensation structures and discovery, the work on
this point must be considered preliminary. And no study even attempts
to determine whether a rule-based response to perceived discovery cost
problems (e.g., presumptive limits on depositions or interrogatories)
would be superior to letting the free-market system operate (e.g., as
when clients negotiate flat, rather than hourly, fee arrangements with
their counsel).
b. Clients
A less common explanation for problems with discovery practice,
but one that underlies some proposed changes to the system, is that
attorneys' actions are shaped by their clients' desires to impose costs
on opponents to punish them or to force them to settle, to delay
resolution of the case, to discourage suits by other potential opponents,
65 See litz ct al. (1993b), supra note 11, at 35-36.
64 See Brazil (1980a), supra note 11, at 240-43.
65 See id. at 235-40.
66 See, e.g., Cooler & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 62-64,69-76.
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to conceal or destroy unfavorable evidence or to protect trade secret,
confidential or otherwise sensitive information. There is relatively little
empirical work on how clients affect the discovery decisions of their
lawyers. Brazil's work suggests that client pressures are more likely to
be felt by large-case litigators and lawyers who act as, or directly with,
in-house corporate counsel.°
c. Judges
Discovery reform proponents have often assumed that certain
problems with discovery practice stem from insufficient or ineffective
case management and that more or different judicial management
techniques would effectively control the nature and scope of discovery.
Three types of studies have addressed the validity of these assumptions.
The first type is exemplified by Connolly's study. This study examined
the effect of different levels of judicial control over discovery on the
duration of the discovery period and volume and pattern of discovery.
He concluded that higher levels of judicial control resulted in closer
conformity to rule provisions specifying time limits for responses to
requests and reduced the time between requests. The time savings were
not achieved at the cost of observable interference with quantity or
choice of discovery requests."
Other studies have asked attorneys about their perceptions of the
judge's role in preventing discovery problems. For example, in his
interviews of Chicago attorneys, Brazil found a high level of disappoint-
ment with judges' failure to prevent discovery problems. When asked
in an open-ended question to identify problems in the discovery sys-
tem, 71% of those interviewed mentioned something negative about
the role of the courts. Sixty-nine percent of all those interviewed, and
93% of big-case litigators, said they did not get "adequate and efficient
help from the courts in resolving discovery disputes and problems."
Those interviewed also expressed frustration with judicial reluctance
to impose sanctions, and noted that when sanctions were imposed, they
were frequently too mild to affect attorneys' cost-benefit calculations.
Eighty percent of those interviewed favored increased judicial use of
the sanctioning power. 69 More recently, Keilitz reported how attor-
neys in four state court jurisdictions rated the importance of six factors
67 See Brazil (1980a), supra note 11, at 230; Brazil (1980b), supra note 11, at 859-62.
66 See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at 52.
69 See Brazil (1980a), supra note 11, at 245-51; Brazil (19806), supra note 11, at 862-69.
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that might inhibit them from seeking court enforcement of discovery
rules:7" In two jurisdictions (Boston and Kansas City), attorneys rated
the item "court is unwilling to resolve discovery disputes" first in im-
portance; attorneys in the other two jurisdictions (New Haven and
Seattle) ranked the item second. Attorneys' perceptions that the court
"is reluctant to impose costs in favor of the prevailing party" also
figured prominently in their reasons for not seeking judicial relief
when discovery problems arose. 7 '
The third type of study that is relevant asked participants in the
discovery system to rate the effectiveness of procedures that augment
or diminish judicial control over discovery. These studies are described
in the next section.
E. Evaluating Changes and Proposed Changes to Discovery Practice
Several surveys have asked attorneys and judges to rate the desir-
ability of various changes to the discovery system. In its 1992 Long
Range Planning Survey, the FJC asked federal judges whether they
supported or opposed eight policy directions. 72 Approximately two-
thirds of the district judges moderately or strongly supported an in-
crease in sanctions for bad-faith discovery responses (e.g., illegitimate
privilege claims or evidence destruction). Almost three-fourths
strongly or moderately supported requiring parties to disclose, before
formal discovery, any material, non-privileged information favorable to
their claims or defenses; only a slight majority supported the manda-
tory disclosure of unfavorable information. (Not surprisingly, then, only
about a third supported leaving the discovery rules as they were before
Rule 26 was revised to include "disclosure"—a revision that was pend-
ing at the time of the survey.) Only slightly more than half of the
district judges moderately or strongly supported one measure designed
for more complex litigation—the increased use of phased discovery in
multiple-issue cases—but more than three-fourths favored document
depositories in mass litigation. Finally, only about half supported the
elimination of local variation in discovery rules."
Keilitz asked attorneys to rate eight proposed discovery reforms
according to their likely effectiveness in controlling the discovery proc-
" See Keilitz et al. (1993b), supra note 11, at 36-37.
71 See id. at 37.
72 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., PLANNING FOR TILE FUTURE: RESULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JUDGES 35 (1994).
73 See id.	 '
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ess. The most favored reform generally was "Impose Costs/Sanctions,"
followed by "Early Conference/Discovery Plan." 74 Describing the im-
plications of their findings for several proposed reforms, Keilitz noted
that because a substantial minority (42%) of cases are resolved without
any formal discovery, automatic disclosure rules might actually in-
crease the burdens on many parties." They also noted that imposing
presumptive limits on the number of depositions is likely to affect only
a small number of cases." (None of the cases in their sample featured
more than ten depositions until the overall number of discovery re-
quests exceeded twenty.) In addition, they found that the existence of
a requirement that attorneys confer in good faith to resolve discovery
disputes before filing motions bore no consistent relationship to the
actual number of discovery motions and rulings. Accordingly, they
expressed doubt about whether such a requirement minimizes discov-
ery costs."
Brazil also questioned attorneys about possible changes in the
judge's role in discovery, the scope of discovery and the attorney-client
privilege." More than half of the respondents favored greater judicial
involvement; an overwhelming majority favored the judges more ag-
gressively imposing sanctions. Respondents were generally in favor of
leaving the scope of discovery and the attorney-client privilege alone.
Although surveys such as the above are useful, studies that de-
scribe the existing discovery system might better identify the need for
a change to discovery practice and the likely impact of that change.
The Connolly report, for example, recommended a model for judicial
case management based on its observations of discovery practice. 7°
Connolly recommended the use of two control tracks—a motions
control track for cases unlikely to involve discovery and a discovery
control track. The latter track would set a deadline for the completion
of discovery and a date for the pretrial conference immediately upon
joinder of the issues, and it would allow enlargements of the discovery
period only on a showing of active discovery during the initial period
and a specific need for more discovery. At the time of the study, these
74 See Keilitz et al. (1993b), supra note 11, at 39. Other reforms that were rated include
"Individual Calendar," "Use Standardized Questions," "Limit Scope of Allowable Discovery,"
"Consistent Application of the Rules," "Encourage Cooperation Between Lawyers" and "Limit the
Time Frame," See id,
75 See Keilitz et al. (1993a), supra note 11, at 14-15.
76 See id. at 15.
77
 See id
78 See Brazil (1980a), supra note 11, at 245-51; Brazil (1980b), supra note 11, at 862-69.
79 See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 11, at 77-84.
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recommendations were similar to those being made by others, but the
Connolly recommendations were more grounded in empirical findings
(e.g., they set out an empirical basis for determining the length of the
discovery period).
Predicting the impact of changes to discovery practice from infor-
mation about the existing system is complicated by the fact that the
legal system is so dynamic; changing one aspect of it may change other
aspects in unanticipated ways. Research that evaluates the impact of
changes to the system—either directly or indirectly, as with the simu-
lation technique—may be needed."
Several studies directly evaluated some change to the system. One
study described the effects of the 1970 amendments to the federal
discovery rules, as measured by a survey of federal judges and a review
of case law.81 Another looked at the effect of limiting the number of
interrogatories parties may serve without leave of court, as measured
by a survey of attorneys." In a more comprehensive study, Weller
evaluated a program adopted in the Los Angeles Municipal and Supe-
rior Courts that eliminated interrogatories, severely limited the avail-
ability of depositions, limited the number of pretrial motions that
could be filed and set time limits for cases in the program." The study
included case file reviews, interviews with court personnel and attorney
questionnaires. The program had mixed effects—it reduced case-proc-
essing time, but attorneys felt that the inability to discover relevant
evidence impaired the quality of both settlements and trials.
Research that describes the amount, type and cost of discovery
activity can help evaluate whether, as some rule proposals assume,
discovery-intensive or discovery-problematic cases can be identified
early in the litigation process for tracking purposes. Additional re-
search is needed, however, to determine whether the differential man-
agement of discovery-intensive cases curbs discovery problems without
causing or exacerbating other problems in the system.
8°Although he did not investigate any rule changes, Shapiro used the simulation technique
to illustrate how particular ambiguities in Rules 26, 33 and 36 could cause serious role conflict
for attorneys and result in widely divergent discovery practices. See David L. Shapiro, Some
Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1055, 1057-59, 1090-92 (1979).
81
 See Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments, 8 Comma. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
623, 623 (1972).
82 See JOHN SIIAPARD & CARROLL SERON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEYS' VIEWS OF
LOCAL RULES LIMITING INTERROGATORIES I , (1994).
83 Steven Weller et al., ELF Revisited: What Happened When Interrogatories Were Eliminated?,
JUDGES' J., Summer 1982, at 10-11.
